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When protective powers
become threatening
Deborah Padfield1
Indefinite and preventive detention: two archetypal danger-areas for the civil-libertarian mind. Both are
permitted by criminal and mental health law, subject to the safeguards provided by common law and the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Watchful eyes need to remain focused on the
interpretation of such powers of detention. 
That any coercive power that can be abused by authority will be so abused seems a reasonable rule of
thumb. Certainly it is the assumption on which responsible legislators ought to work; even if they are
willing to trust their own imperturbability in the face of events they have no right to do so, or so to trust
their successors. Stop-and-search has been heavily abused,2 while the limits on control orders are under
judicial scrutiny domestically and at Strasbourg.3
Terrorism trials and those involving notoriously violent criminals catch headlines, especially where
mental disorder is involved. My concern here is the looseness of provisions which, operating out of the
public eye, can indefinitely detain people on preventive grounds. 
Popular fear as basis for detention
In the context of mental health, government has a major anti-stigma campaign in operation. Thus a
Department of Health (DoH) perspective: 
‘...the killing of strangers by people with mental illness is rare; most stranger homicides are committed by
young men without mental illness who are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The public may fear
the mentally ill but they are more at risk from heavy drinkers.’4
Risk-aversion, however, having gained a popular voice which no politician can ignore, has become a
political tool which few politicians will eschew. Speaking at the 2010 Conservative Party Conference,
Justice Secretary Ken Clarke espoused community sentencing for short-term prisoners while reiterating
that the goals of prison were public safety and punishment, ‘and also’ reduction of reoffending.5 His policy
shift has not diluted a former Home Secretary’s emphasis on risk: 
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“I am... proposing to take new powers to enable dangerous and high-risk offenders to be better
managed... The plans which we have recently announced to amend mental health legislation will help to
ensure that mentally disordered offenders get the treatment they need and that the risk which they pose to
the public is minimised...”6
This is an idealised win-win scenario. It suggests that offenders are thus detained for their own sake and
the protection of others. That is not what the Mental Health Act says. Rather, patients can be detained
for their own health and safety or for the protection of other people. The Mental Health Act – before and
after the reform of 2007 – provides for psychiatric detention purely on the grounds of dangerousness.
Both perceptions are true: violence by mentally disordered people represents a minority of crimes but a
small number of serious offences remain the high-profile work of seriously disturbed (mainly) men. Policy
thus has to tackle stigma and public protection. The question here is whether policy addresses not merely
actual but also perceived danger, an inflation resulting in the lawful but unnecessary detention of people
whose human rights are inadequately protected by domestic or Convention law. 
Though Parliament has not inhibited assaults on civil liberties7 and the Courts have shown an uneven
resistance,8 there are checks on centralised control. Indeed, the Labour administration showed no
coherent purpose of increasing such control, in its first term incorporating the ECHR in the Human Rights
Act 1998 and passing the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
Nevertheless, thresholds of detention have been falling under criminal and mental health law. That fall
relies significantly on public fear. After every public-authority-related tragedy, even while the seeds of
future tragedies continue to be sown, the same meaningless mantra is mouthed: ‘it must never happen
again’. Where detention is concerned, a sense of entitlement to a uniquely risk-free society combines with
denial of the limitations of risk prediction to produce an uncritical appetite for control, or
‘management’.10 Following rather than engaging with media reactions, politicians help to create a climate
within which borderline discharge decisions become ever more difficult.
In relation to criminal law, the Labour government legitimised an expansion of prison populations by
arguing that the policy is ‘“protecting the public from thousands of offences a year which might otherwise
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have occurred”.11 Crime is disproportionately presented as violent and sexual, provoking an exaggerated
perception of the need for penal and preventive imprisonment.12
Inevitably, the stakes are raised by high-profile tragedies. The 2006 Anthony Rice murder13 helped to
provoke then-Prime Minister Blair into requiring Home Secretary John Reid to question whether judicial
interpretation of the HRA was unacceptably overruling government policy.14 It is a valid question for the
executive; but the overall message of government’s response was to use the tragedy as an opportunity of
responding to popular fear, rather than of tackling the far-from-zero-sum relationship between individual
freedom and public safety. 
Scare stories about tragically ill-fated releases of psychiatric patients show a corresponding rationale.15 A
study of ‘Media influences on mental health policy’ following the Clunis and Silcock cases concluded that
while press coverage had been partly motivated by a desire to improve psychiatric care, policy responses
to public fears had produced increased constraints upon mentally disordered people.16 Citing a Texan
judgment in 2006, Richards LJ commented revealingly on the rights of mentally ill people:
‘“One who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at
liberty nor free of stigma… It cannot be said, therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill person to
‘go free’ than for a mentally normal person to be committed.”
‘Furthermore the consequences that may flow from the release of a person suffering from mental disorder
include not only a risk to the individual's own health and safety..., but also a risk of harm to other
members of the public.... [A] person whose case is being considered under section 73 was detained in 
the first place pursuant to a hospital order... following conviction for a criminal offence, often an offence
of violence: the appalling facts of N’s [sic] own case are very much in point....’17
Various points here. Firstly, the belief that neither liberty nor freedom from stigma is possible for a
‘debilitatingly’ mentally ill person, so that incarceration is less bad (damaging? painful? morally suspect?)
than for a ‘mentally normal person’. Such demotion of minorities to marginal subhumanity has a malign
history. Secondly, note the slippage from the particulars of AN’s ‘appalling’ case to generalisation about
people suffering from mental disorder. 
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This is not an isolated instance. A few years earlier, quoting a judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR), Lord Clyde had referred approvingly to the ECHR’s equation of ‘persons of unsound
mind, alcoholics and drug addicts’. 
“The reason why the Convention allows the latter individuals, all of whom are socially maladjusted, to be
deprived of their liberty is not only that they have to be considered as occasionally dangerous for public
safety but also that their own interests may necessitate their detention.”18
The specific outcome was to legitimise the indefinite detention of 12 men diagnosed with ‘psychopathic
personality disorders’ and assessed as highly dangerous, but not amenable to lawful imprisonment or
assessed as treatable; the ‘own interests’ argument, with no place in mental health law, can be little more
than a paternalistic attempt at moral justification. 
The problem here is not the (uncontentious) assertion that some mentally disordered people may be
‘occasionally dangerous’, but the suggested presumption of such a connection. A similar carelessness – or
prejudice – marks his judgment a little earlier: “One of the immediate concerns which one has about such
persons is that of public safety...”19 It is a presumption which one-sidedly weights the evidence needed for
courts balancing the interests of mentally disordered people and public safety, and which gives authority
to popular fears. 
The judiciary is not blind to its relationship with popular fear. The Parole Board in 1977 agonised over
the extent to which its decisions on notorious prisoners should be influenced by public opinion; its 1986
Report ‘felt it necessary to spell out that public perceptions were part of the risk assessment process with
the Board taking into account "the degree of abhorrence with which society regards that offence and the
likely public reaction to the offender's early release from custody". This can be contrasted with the long-
standing principle that public reaction is not relevant to judicial sentencing and release decisions.’20 That
principle is spelt out by Goff LJ in the Venables and Thompson case: “I wish to draw a distinction...
between public concern of a general nature with regard to, for example, the prevalence of certain types
of offence, and the need that those who commit such offences should be duly punished; and public
clamour that a particular offender whose case is under consideration should be singled out for severe
punishment. It is legitimate for a sentencing authority to take the former concern into account, but not
the latter”.21 It is a principle deserving closer consideration in political as well as judicial contexts.22
Governments shrink from confronting populist fears, being characteristically unwilling to open up
discussion of the limits of risk assessment or of the complex relationship between incarceration and risk
reduction. The former administration’s simultaneous desire to present the DoH anti-stigma campaign
made incoherence inevitable. One had to take centre stage; the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) won. The
Coalition government has not indicated any shift in this balance. 
Levels of detention
What is the evidence to support government’s enthusiasm for preventive detention? One needs to look
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at the kinds of detention involved. Part III of the Mental Health Act deals with people who are facing, or
have faced, criminal charges, while indeterminate prison sentences – now primarily mandatory and
discretionary life sentences and sentences of Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) – permit
imprisonment beyond the penal minimum term. 
Looking therefore at the relevant figures: while overall NHS psychiatric bed numbers are falling,23 those
in NHS medium-secure units have been rising;24 the units for Dangerous & Serious Personality
Disordered (DSPD) patients,25 High-Security Hospitals (HSHs) and private facilities26 are additional to
that rise. In 2009, the Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC) welcomed a ‘recent upturn’ in the use
of s37 hospital orders, ‘on the grounds that every individual case is a diversion from the criminal justice
system’; however, ‘in the light of the massive increase in prison population during this period... the overall
proportion of diversions may have fallen considerably....’27 Moreover, the upturn is accounted for solely
by 37/41 detentions – restricted hospital orders.28 Singh and Moncrieff argue that a rise in ss 2, 3 and
37/41 detentions, combined with steady levels of discharge on appeal, may suggest a lowering of the
threshold for detention (restricted and unrestricted) and rise of that for discharge.29 Last year saw a
record number of Part III detentions.30
Tracking figures is not straightforward. Though 2009/10 saw a slight reversal in the trend since 2002-03
towards court and prison disposals in private hospitals at the expense of NHS facilities,31 the private
sector remains significant. ‘Information is not collected by the Department [of Health] on the proportion
or cost of personality disorder placements made in the private sector’; furthermore, ‘[i]nformation is not
collected centrally on the effectiveness of personality disorder placements commissioned by PCTs
[primary care trusts] from the private sector.’32 Given that the Care Quality Commission relies heavily
29
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Attorney General's Reference No. 55 of 2008 (C and
Others) [2008] EWCA Crim 2790. 
42. See Ministry of Justice, The Future of the Parole Board:
consultation paper 14/09, (2009) para 29, and Secretary
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on self-assessment by private providers, such lack of information is unsurprising.33 People confined in a
unique ‘position of inferiority and powerlessness’34 are being lost to official or public sight. 
Meanwhile, seriously worrying numbers of mentally disordered people are in prison35 while prisoner
numbers are at a record high and rising, albeit more slowly than in the recent years.36 The rise was linked
to the introduction of IPP under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA),37 together with an upward trend in
recalls, tougher licence conditions, greater surveillance of those on licence and growing risk-aversion by
the Board38 and the withdrawal of End of Custody Licence in March 2010. The levelling-off is
attributable partly to the Criminal Justice & Immigration Act 2008 (CJIA),39 including amendments to IPP
which reduced the remarkable swathe of offences accounted dangerous.40 CJIA also restored judicial
discretion in sentencing, abolishing the mandatory assumption that those committing offences potentially
attracting IPP were indeed dangerous.41
Detention for the safety of others
So what are the legal grounds for non-punitive detention on the grounds of dangerousness to others?  The
quick answer is ‘very broad’. 
The Parole Board is “the court” responsible under Article 5(4) of the ECHR for deciding the continuing
lawfulness of detention of prisoners for whom the original justification under Article 5(1)(a) has ended.
Statute and case law have in the last couple of decades produced a complication of sentences, but the
Board’s remit includes indeterminate prisoners who have served their punitive minimum term.
Lawfulness after this is on the grounds solely of public safety. The Board has an apparently-specific
criterion for continued imprisonment in the ‘life and limb’ test for lifers,42 recognised as leaving the level
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48. In Mental Health Act Manual, 13th ed., Sweet &
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[2003] 37 E.H.R.R. 9 and D (1987). 
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of acceptable risk ‘wholly undefined’ because indefinable43 and subject to executive direction.44 The
concept of burden of proof has been ruled ‘inappropriate when one is involved in risk evaluation’,45 but
the prisoner must in practice demonstrate that the risk he poses is not more than minimal.
The element of arbitrariness built into such judgments is illustrated by the comparison of monthly average
figures for the numbers detained under IPP pre- and post-2008 and their average pre-tariff sentence-
length. Under the original range of offences whose perpetrators were accounted dangerous, 140 IPP
prisoners were received per month, serving 38 months. Under the amended terms of reference, 45 IPPs
were received, serving 60 months. The sentence now focuses on fewer, more serious offenders. Yet the
Parole Board’s assessment inevitably has as its starting point the assessment of all these prisoners, pre-
and post-2008, as ‘dangerous’. The loss of any connection between imprisonment and rehabilitation is an
easy casualty, despite the inclusion of rehabilitation in the purposes of imprisonment in the Criminal
Justice Act 2003.46 Nor does this amendment to IPP signal diminished faith in detention; it merely trims
a notoriously under-considered piece of legislation.47
The Mental Health Tribunal is the Article 5(4) reviewing ‘court’ for people detained under the MHA
and covered by Article 5(1)(e). A criterion for MHA detention is an undefined need for ‘the protection
of other persons’.48 Under that provision, there is a yet more serious loss of connection – that between
detention and treatment, even for the symptoms of mental disorder;49 to lose that link would be to accept
that psychiatry had become an overt means of control. 
After 1983, the scope of the original provision of detention solely for the protection of others was
gradually extended by the judiciary.50 The battle for reform finally producing the MHA 2007 challenged
that extension: referring to an earlier Bill but making an argument pertinent to the final Act, the Mental
Health Alliance was ‘particularly disturbed by the over-emphasis in the Bill on protection of the public
from "dangerous" people and the disastrous impact this will have on those people it targets and on the
vast majority of mental health patients who pose no danger to anyone.’51 In the upshot the 2007 Act’s
inclusion of personality disorders52 through abolition of the old ‘categories’, and its wider definition of
31
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57. Phillips LJ commented obiter on the common law ‘best
interest’ requirement for medical treatment, citing the
relevance of such ‘wider considerations’ as the possibility of
less intrusive treatments to ‘achieve the same result’. Since
that ‘same result’ has to include the considerations not
only of health but of others’ safety, it is unlikely that ‘best
interests’ can go far in limiting the scope of the law. See R
(B) v (1) Dr S; (2) Dr G; (3) SoS for Health [2006]
EWCA Civ 28 at [62]. 
58. Ashingdane v UK [1985] 7 EHRR 528 at [551].
Ashingdane also ruled that psychiatric detention must be
in an appropriate institution.
59. Winterwerp v The Netherlands [1979-80] 2 E.H.R.R.
387. See also Ashingdane at [44] for a ruling that there
must be ‘some relationship between the ground of
permitted deprivation of liberty relied on and the place and
conditions of detention’.  
60. B. Hale, ‘Justice and equality in mental health law: The
European experience’ (2007) 30 International Journal of
Law and Psychiatry 18-28 p27. The case is closely similar
with the non-definition of ‘appropriate’ treatment and
indeed of its ‘availability’; which will also no doubt
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Bill Minutes of Evidence: Memorandum from the Mental
Health Alliance (DMH 105) (9 March 2005), in
particular Part 4.
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102 (AAC) at [33] and [24]; MD v Nottinghamshire
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‘treatment’,53 merely confirmed judicial extension of the law.54
During the passage of the MHA 2007, the Mental Health Act Commission expressed concern that
detention could be legitimised by merely intended benefit to the disorder or its symptoms without evidence
of likely benefit. It cited the draft Code of Practice, case-law and Jones to argue that individual ‘best
interests’ should remain a criterion,55 but the published Code contained no such reference. Indeed, while
under the Code ‘Simply detaining someone – even in a hospital – does not constitute medical treatment’,
detaining that person with nursing and ‘specialist day-to-day care’ under clinical supervision and in a ‘safe
and secure therapeutic environment with a structured regime’ does.56 It is a largely semantic distinction. 
The Code follows the case-law.57 cited above is Lord Clyde’s assertion of the power under MHA 1983
and the EHRC to detain people for the sake of public protection on the basis of their mental disorder and
in the absence of treatment. That judgment followed Ashingdane, where only the minority judgment
emphasised the difference in purpose between imprisonment and hospital detention, the latter involving
the ‘…duty of the executive... to strive after the means most likely to bring a cure....’58 The majority
followed Winterwerp in ruling that the right to appropriate treatment could not be derived from Article
5(1)(e).59 For Lady Hale, the indefinite confinement of capable and untreatable non-criminals under
MHA could not be a ‘justifiable discrimination’; she deplored Strasbourg’s refusal to define ‘unsound
mind’ in Article 5(1)(e) and thus restrict its potential abuse.60 Her concern mirrored that of the Mental
Health Alliance.61
This lack of clear definition of ‘mental disorder’ or ‘appropriate treatment’, including the distinction
between detention in a therapeutic ‘milieu’ and mere containment, continues to exercise judges.
Unfortunately, their rulings remain so hedged about by ‘if’, ‘may’, ‘might’ and other qualifiers that their
call to Tribunals to apply the statutory conditions to the specifics of each case produces more appearance
than reality of safeguard.62 Lack of definition remains a mighty weapon.
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188 British Journal of Psychiatry 143-147, for an analysis
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Prison or hospital?
If people can be detained purely for the protection of others under criminal and mental health law, what
is the distinction between them? 
In principle, and probably in practice in terms of the experiential difference between even a HSH and a
high-security prison, there is a profound distinction in terms of the institutions’ rationale and the
motivations and professional ethos of the detaining authorities. Hoggett, now Lady Hale, is a prime
proponent of a principled difference between the two regimes. ‘The gulf between pure preventive
detention and some sort of medical care and treatment may be very narrow, but it is nonetheless deep...;
although she also makes it clear that a gulf so narrow is liable to be bridged.63 Dyson LJ subsequently
spelled out the ‘subtle yet important differences’ between Tribunal and Board. Before the Tribunal,
‘[w]hile risk to the public is a factor it is not determinative in the absence of evidence that the patient
meets the criteria for detention in hospital under the Act’. Before the Parole Board, ‘primacy of risk’ to
the public must be respected.64
Hallett LJ insists on the principle that ‘the Mental Health Act regime under a hospital order focuses on
reducing the risk of a recurrence of mental illness as opposed to reducing the risk of re-offending...’65
Parallel reasoning holds for restricted patients: the judiciary must resist any temptation to see a transfer
direction as a means of prolonging penal detention.66 Though restriction-direction patients continue to
serve their sentence while detained in hospital, psychiatric detention is not (in principle) punitive. So at
least Lady Hale argues, commenting on the tendency of Strasbourg to treat psychiatric hospital and
prison together and referencing her own Appeal Court ruling in Munjaz on their different purposes.67
Sentencing courts must therefore (try to)68 distinguish where on the gradient a law-breaker stands:
between offences directly attributable to a mental disorder and those where, despite such a disorder, the
causal link is ‘diminished’ or absent.69 At the one end lies a hospital order, probably with restriction;70 at
the other a prison sentence, even if a transfer/restriction direction is subsequently needed;71 in the middle
a hospital/limitation direction.72
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Such complexities make for effectively arbitrary disposals. The MHA 2007 has removed the separate
provisions for mental illness and ‘psychopathic disorder’. But legal and clinical understandings of mental
disorder continue to differ, driven by different agendas.73 In Murray, sentencing guidelines and
M’Naghton Rules enforced a penal disposal, though the Appeal Court subsequently moved the claimant
to hospital.74 However, the rules remain open to the influence of fear: either hospital or prison can be
chosen as providing the longest and securest sentence. Thus the MHAC disapprovingly cited the refusal
of the sentencing judge to send Nicky Reilly (diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome and learning disability)
for assessment in Broadmoor before passing a life sentence.75 In Simpson, the Appeal Court overturned
the original prison disposal primarily on the grounds not of the offender’s treatability, but because ‘the
best chance of minimising the danger lies in a Hospital Order…’. While Toulson LJ spoke of the (dim)
hope of rehabilitation through medical treatment, the security implications were decisive.76 The situation
was even clearer in IA, where the sentencing judge handed down a life sentence in the ‘hope and
expectation’ that Mr IA would be detained in hospital; however, ‘little or nothing appeared to [be] done
to effect the transfer’.77
It is partly a question of supply and demand. Given that prison beds are uniquely available on demand
whatever the overcrowding, many prisoners assessed as needing hospital are not transferred.78 The ruling
in IH is interesting: continued detention of a patient potentially fit for conditional discharge is not
unlawful where the ‘nature’ criterion is satisfied and where no appropriate community provision is
available.79 The funding priorities of PCTs and local government thus define the limits of lawful
detention.80
So while prisons bulge with mentally disordered inmates, beds in secure units and HSHs are occupied by
patients ‘sectioned’ more for security than health reasons. AT indicates the readiness with which
Hoggett’s ‘gulf’ can be bridged by the use of hospital as place of indefinite preventive detention.81
Personality disorder diagnoses in particular are open to control-oriented interpretation: prisoners put
forward by the Prison Service for transfer under the MHA can be deemed unsuitable by the Secretary of
State [SoS] because of their ‘untreatable’ personality disorder82 yet identically-diagnosed prisoners
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80. See also Creighton 2006, p114 for discussion of AT v UK
[1995] 20 EHRR CD 59. The possibility of a transfer
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Civil Commitment, Ashgate, (2003) p279 for discussion
of the effective bed-blocking in high security hospitals by
patients whom the SoS refused to recategorise to lower
security levels; and p275 on the way in which
indeterminate restricted patients early in their sentences
can be confined in high security hospitals on grounds of
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34
Journal of Mental Health Law Spring 2011
hitherto deemed ‘untreatable’ can now be transferred under that same Act, and detained indefinitely.83
In TF, the Appeal Court ruled that a transfer direction effected in September 2008, just before MHA
2007 was implemented and on the eve of young TF’s release, was under s47(1)(b) unlawful in the absence
of adequate medical evidence;  the SoS’ eleventh-hour attempt to continue detaining that personality-
disordered offender had been one degree too clumsy.85
The rationale of recalls is similarly blurred. The SoS can recall a conditionally discharged patient though
his disorder is not of the statutory ‘degree’ for initial detention ‘because the combination of the patient’s
mental disorder and his behaviour makes it necessary’ for public safety.86 The recall decision depends only
‘partly’ on medical advice, ‘comparatively minor irregularities of behaviour or failure to cooperate with
supervisors being sufficient’; though behaviour unconnected with the mental disorder does not merit the
‘sanction’ of recall, ‘the decision will always give precedence to public safety considerations’ – a powerful
catch-all.87 The SoS apparently regards recall as a ‘sanction’ though its role is non-punitive. 
But perhaps the most revealing indicator of an effectively arbitrary executive use of detention is the MoJ’s
range of responses when a conditionally discharged patient is reconvicted and sentenced to prison. ‘[T]he
SoS will often reserve judgement on the patient’s status under the Mental Health Act 1983 until he nears
the end of his prison sentence, when he will seek fresh medical evidence....’, on the basis of which he may
allow conditional discharge to resume, direct immediate recall to hospital or authorise absolute
discharge.88 The ‘need’ for hospital is again provoked only by the proximity of release.89
Optimists in search of rationales based on criminogenic or therapeutic priorities may despair. The Board’s
judgments on criminogenic risk can face executive challenge on the grounds that the offender’s mental
health renders its evidence unsafe, thus challenging the validity of its specialist work.90 Meanwhile, the
SoS’ focus on immediate risk-avoidance must be deeply frustrating for courts aware that for some
personalities, continued detention and over-stringent risk management on release increase longer-term
risks of reoffending.91
Again, the Tribunal may review pre-tariff lifer restriction-direction patients whose detention may have
no therapeutic or a counter-therapeutic effect, without effective power to discharge them: that lies with
the Board. The discharge of post-tariff lifers under restriction directions, assessed by the Tribunal as ready
for conditional discharge into the community but not back to prison, may be indefinitely blocked by a
When protective powers become threatening
35
83. As in Anderson supra f/n 18. 
84. The arrival of such evidence after the transfer took place
did not render the initial action retrospectively lawful. 
85. R (TF) v SoS for Justice [2008] EWCA Civ 1457.
86. Ministry of Justice, Guidance for clinical supervisors, (18
March 2009) para 63.
87. MoJ Guidance (2009) para 62. This guidance closely
follows Toulson LJ’s ruling in R (MM) v SoS for the
Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 687. The
judgment emphasises at [48] the potential difficulty of
assessing the moment at which recall is justified; the
Guidance is simpler in its emphasis on the priority of
public safety. 
88. MoJ Guidance (2009) para 70.
89. The MoJ Guidance (2009) must be seen in the light of its
genesis as a response to ‘failures in supervision which
contributed to homicides being committed by conditionally
discharged patients: ’ ibid para 2. 
90. See Murray v Parole Board [2003] EWCA Civ 1561 at
[13] et seq., quoting Oldham v UK (Application no
36273/97, 26 September 2000. Despite strong positive
evidence of a prisoner’s reduced criminogenic
dangerousness, the SoS argued for continued imprisonment
on the grounds that ‘mental instability posing risks of
dangerousness’ is innately less amenable to change over
time than ‘mental disorder in the context of mental illness’. 
91. See J. Craissati, ‘The paradoxical effects of stringent risk
management: community failure and sex offenders’, in N.
Padfield (ed.), ‘Who to Release? Parole, fairness and
criminal justice’, Willans Publishing, (2007) p227. 
92. Current conversations suggest that the current MoJ
Consultation (2009) is likely to elicit many calls, from
Board members amongst others, for the Board to give itself
more flexibility about such requirements.
93. See A and others v United Kingdom [2009] ECHR
3455/05 at, for example, [76].
94. See Anderson at [63-65], supra f/n 18.
95. See Hoggett (1990) p291, supra f/n 63. With reference to
the ‘exalted membership’, it should be noted that those
eligible to preside at restricted patient hearings have been
extended beyond Circuit Judges and Recorders who are
also Queen’s Counsel, to include a number of salaried
Tribunal Judges.
96. See the anxieties on this subject expressed by the Mental
Health Alliance: Memorandum (9 March 2005), para
6.5.
97. P. Mullen, ‘Dangerous and severe personality disorder and
in need of treatment’ (2007) 190 British Journal of
Psychiatry s4. 
98. Pill LJ in R (P) v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2002]
MHLR 253 CA at [23]. 
99. Bradley Report (2009) p109.
100.For a passionate response by a senior psychiatrist, see D.
Kingdon, ‘DSPD or ‘Don’t Stigmatise People in Distress’’
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Board wary of their lack of criminogenic course-work or testing in open prison.92 Tribunal members
clinging to belief in the MHA’s therapeutic rationale will be troubled by the evidence in A and Others of
the psychological impact of indefinite detention.93
Anderson presents the incoherences starkly. His disorder having been assessed as untreatable, Mr
Anderson could not be held in a prison hospital wing because (unsurprisingly) no treatment was available
for him; he could nevertheless be indefinitely detained in hospital. Furthermore, while he required
hospitalisation because he was too dangerous to be held in prison, assessment of his dangerousness was
deemed to be beyond the Tribunal’s sole remit.94
Thus while the Board can grant parole to mentally disordered prisoners who have (randomly) avoided
restriction directions, the Tribunal cannot free restriction direction patients. The logic is comprehensible
given that the criminal sentence has priority as the detaining rationale: Article 5(1)(a) rather than
5(1)(e). But since the Board’s task of risk assessment is shared by restricted patient Tribunal panels in
addition to their mental health responsibilities, it seems absurd for these Tribunals with their ‘exalted
membership’ not to have the power of release.95 The situation is a looking-glass land of situations whose
essential likeness is revealed yet divided by law. 
Perhaps the least adequately defined of all prisoners and patients are the ‘personality disordered’,96 whose
situation encapsulates the potential arbitrariness of the dual system. ‘Why does he keep committing
crimes? Because he is a psychopath. How do you know he's a psychopath? Because he keeps committing
crimes.’97 It is the next twist which is deadly: the ‘extent to which abnormally aggressive or seriously
irresponsible conduct now occurs may throw light on whether there is a psychopathic disorder, but the
disorder may still exist, even if there has been no such conduct for several years.’98 How do you know he’s
a psychopath? Because he used to be seriously irresponsible. 
The problem has two sub-divisions. One is the legitimacy in principle of indeterminate preventive
detention. The other is the lack of any clear division between incontrovertibly dangerous ‘psychopaths’
and other personality disordered individuals. For Lord Bradley, the government’s DSPD programme (for
dangerous and severe personality disordered people) was a positive step towards treating the hitherto
‘untreatable’ PD population.99 Others are more suspicious. For them it is a confirmation of all that is
prejudiced and stigmatising;100 an attempt to conceal indefinite detention behind mental health
legislation;101 a malign use of hospitalisation for social control.102 Psychiatrists have denounced the
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categorisation as undefined and clinically unrecognised.103 DSPD has been described as a ‘monster’
created by government as a precursor to ‘draconian legislative powers’, which though not themselves
materialising had an equivalent in IPP.104 Moncrieff has a parallel concern, focused on the treatment of
patients restricted for a wide variety of reasons ‘as if they were restricted for the same reason – the
protection of the public from serious harm.’105 In a culture in which indefinite detention has become
legally normalised, lack of definition permits ‘dangerousness’ to become the scientist’s despair: an
unfalsifiable proposition and a statement of prejudice and aversion.106
Conclusion
Moral cowardice lay at the heart of the previous government’s discussion and formulation of policy on
dangerous individuals. The British Association of Social Workers noted the contrast between the
extension of compulsory powers to include personality disordered patients under the Mental Health Bill
2007 with the lack of actual funds for treatment of such disorders, in hospital or the community.107 It is
hard to make sense of government policy save by recognising its desire to be seen as tough on crime and
disorder and the individuals which exemplify them, without needing to take on the long-term
expenditure needed to address the needs of electorally unrewarding social misfits. 
Compulsion, whether in hospital or in the community, is a policy of containment which minimises costs
while maximising electoral advantage. Were the motives otherwise, the DoH anti-stigma campaign,
supported by coherent policies of health and social care, would be at the forefront of political self-
presentation and funds, not the MoJ’s crime and disorder agenda. For the policy rides in the face of
evidence that popular fears legitimate unnecessarily harsh legislation and counter-productively cautious
decision-making on sentencing and release.108
Concern about the implications of this legal situation for effectively arbitrary detention need not rest on
any political judgment about the intentions of the last or present government. Legal safeguards exist to
protect us against potential as well as actual danger; when abuse ceases to be potential, it is probably too
late to guard against it. Therein lies the inadequacy of denying the threat to civil liberties posed by recent
terrorism legislation on the grounds of government’s benign intentions.  
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When protective powers become threatening
Challenges to populist myths about the equations of mental disorder and crime with dangerousness by
one part of government are swamped by executive pronouncements, statute and case-law which validate
them. Fantasies about a risk-free society are politically manipulated. Lawful powers exist and are
exercised to detain people indefinitely and preventively; such detention can be maximised by the
selective use of mental health and criminal law. The ECHR provides protection against abuses, but is
generous in its definition of the lawful. 
The problem of dangerous anti-social behaviour is real, and the balance to be struck between individual
freedom and public safety demands continuing debate. But such conversation must involve more
imaginative consideration of how a society can deal with its own ‘brokenness’, less fear-driven approaches
to mental disorder and more historical awareness of the significance of civil liberties. 
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